POLITICAL ECONOMY & INSTITUTIONS WORKSHOP: Andrew Ballard (Duke University)

POLITICAL ECONOMY & INSTITUTIONS WORKSHOP: Andrew Ballard (Duke University) presents, "Public Statements as Precommitment Devices" | Gross Hall 270 | October 4 | 12pm

Abstract:
There are often competing tensions between the goals of parties and their members. On one hand, members of Congress (MCs) need the party's brand to be effective, and they need access to parties' other electoral and legislative resources. But given the heterogeneity in district composition and member goals, MCs also want to be able to act on their own, advancing their own policy agenda or the desires of their constituents. In these situations of divergence of interest, parties must develop and use a variety of "carrot-and-stick" measures to induce recalcitrant members to cooperate in supporting clearly defined partisan positions on many issues. I present an account of policymaking that explains how parties attempt to extract "Yea" votes necessary to pass bills from members who want to vote "Nay," and to ensure those members follow through and vote with the party.