BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:BedeWork V3.5 VERSION:2.0 METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 TZNAME:EDT DTSTART:20070311T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=2SU END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 TZNAME:EST DTSTART:20071104T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=11;BYDAY=1SU END:STANDARD BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:-045602 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 TZNAME:EST DTSTART:18831118T120358 RDATE:18831118T120358 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 TZNAME:EDT DTSTART:19180331T020000 RDATE:19180331T020000 RDATE:19190330T020000 RDATE:19200328T020000 RDATE:19210424T020000 RDATE:19220430T020000 RDATE:19230429T020000 RDATE:19240427T020000 RDATE:19250426T020000 RDATE:19260425T020000 RDATE:19270424T020000 RDATE:19280429T020000 RDATE:19290428T020000 RDATE:19300427T020000 RDATE:19310426T020000 RDATE:19320424T020000 RDATE:19330430T020000 RDATE:19340429T020000 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RDATE:19841028T020000 RDATE:19851027T020000 RDATE:19861026T020000 RDATE:19871025T020000 RDATE:19881030T020000 RDATE:19891029T020000 RDATE:19901028T020000 RDATE:19911027T020000 RDATE:19921025T020000 RDATE:19931031T020000 RDATE:19941030T020000 RDATE:19951029T020000 RDATE:19961027T020000 RDATE:19971026T020000 RDATE:19981025T020000 RDATE:19991031T020000 RDATE:20001029T020000 RDATE:20011028T020000 RDATE:20021027T020000 RDATE:20031026T020000 RDATE:20041031T020000 RDATE:20051030T020000 RDATE:20061029T020000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 TZNAME:EST DTSTART:19200101T000000 RDATE:19200101T000000 RDATE:19420101T000000 RDATE:19460101T000000 RDATE:19670101T000000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 TZNAME:EWT DTSTART:19420209T020000 RDATE:19420209T020000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 TZNAME:EPT DTSTART:19450814T190000 RDATE:19450814T190000 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Ethics CATEGORIES:Diversity/Inclusion CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Research CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=00f1fcdb-0f068baf-010f-068baf83-00000004:None CREATED:20240321T155700Z DESCRIPTION:Abstract: According to the Madhyamaka tradition of Buddhism\, if being real means that a thing exists with the nature it has independen tly of how\, or if\, it is cognized by minded creatures like us\, then no thing is real. One important Abhidharma tradition of Buddhism\, however\, maintains that there are real entities-fundamental trope-like entities c alled dharmas-that serve as the ontological foundation of ordinary concre te objects and mental states. To motivate the Madhyamaka global anti-real ist position\, the 2nd century philosopher Nāgārjuna argues that Abhidhar ma realism is inconsistent. He argues that the Buddhist doctrine of depen dent origination-the view that all phenomena in time occur on the basis o f conditions-is inconsistent with the Abhidharma view that some entities are fundamental and hence ultimately real. If all entities are dependentl y originated\, Nāgārjuna argues\, then they cannot be ultimately real. Ho wever\, the Abhidharma view that is presented as the target of Madhyamaka criticism in these arguments does not reflect the actual views of Vaibhā ṣika tradition of Abhidharma. In particular\, Nāgārjuna characterizes fun damental entities as completely ontologically independent of other entiti es whereas the Vaibhāṣika does not. In this essay I will clarify the Vaib hāṣika understanding of dependent origination and their notion of fundame ntality and demonstrate that Nāgārjuna's arguments do not establish the c laim that nothing is ultimately real. The Vaibhāṣika position is of philo sophical interest because it serves as an historical example of a view th at maintains that it is possible for fundamental entities to be ontologic al dependent. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20240321T155700Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240405T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20240321T155700Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Laura Guerrero on “A Defense of Buddhist Realism” UID:CAL-8a0292fd-8d13410f-018e-61badea2-00007fd8demobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Ethics:/user/public-user/Top ics/Ethics X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Diversity/Inclusion:/user/pu blic-user/Topics/Diversity_Inclusion X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Research:/user/public-user/T opics/Research X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Philosophy Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:1815 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:1210 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:1815 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:1210 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Laura Guerrero X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:esb54 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/thumbnail_guererro_headshot_20240321035526 PM.jpg X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/thumbnail_guererro_headshot_20240321 035526PM-thumb.png X-BEDEWORK-STUDENT-CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-EMAIL=emmaline.bouchillon@duke .edu:Emmaline Bouchillon END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Ethics CATEGORIES:Human Rights CATEGORIES:Diversity/Inclusion CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=00f1fcdb-0f068baf-010f-068baf83-00000004:None CREATED:20240325T195537Z DESCRIPTION:Abstract: I will argue that work in social ontology (as in oth er areas of metaphysics) can benefit from engaging with work on the devel opment of language and the functions language serves in human life. For s ocial ontology\, as we usually think of it\, deals with questions about w hat (social) entities there are\, and what their natures are. But this pr esupposes a certain way of thinking about the language we use in discussi ng the social world-that it merely serves to pick out or describe feature s of the world we can investigate. Before we move forward with metaphysic al questions on this assumption\, I will argue\, we need to step back to ask questions about the functions of the relevant forms of language in hu man life. We can get help with this project from systemic functional ling uistics\, which begins from anthropological questions about the functions different aspects of language serve in human life. Beginning from unders tanding the functions of different forms of language about the social wor ld can help us avoid wasting time on irrelevant metaphysical questions\, and re-focus our attention on understanding how social terms of different kinds work--and how they can lead to both important new bureaucratic and theoretic enablements\, and sometimes to new and hidden forms of injusti ce. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20240325T195537Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240412T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20240325T195537Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Amie Thomasson on "“Social Ontology and Social Language” UID:CAL-8a0292fd-8d13410f-018e-772ec694-00004356demobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Ethics:/user/public-user/Top ics/Ethics X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Human Rights:/user/public-us er/Topics/Human Rights X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Diversity/Inclusion:/user/pu blic-user/Topics/Diversity_Inclusion X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Amie Thomasson X-BEDEWORK-STUDENT-CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-EMAIL=emmaline.bouchillon@duke .edu:Emmaline Bouchillon X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:36 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:19 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:566 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:372.3333333333333 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:530 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:353.3333333333333 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Amie Thomasson X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:esb54 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/thumbnail_20180209_thomasson_eb_023_202403 25075537PM.jpg X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/thumbnail_20180209_thomasson_eb_023_ 20240325075537PM-thumb.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Ethics CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Conference/Symposium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=8a0183a7-83184018-0183-38bee57b-00005267:Gilbert\, Rachel CREATED:20240606T163635Z DESCRIPTION:Please join the Philosophy Department in welcoming Jenann Isma el for her talk at our first colloquium of the year.\nI am the William H. Miller III Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. Previou sly I was Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University and affiliate of the Zuckerman Institute. I have also taught at Stanford University (199 6-98) and the University of Arizona (1998-2018).\n\nMy areas of specializ ation are Philosophy of Physics\; Metaphysics\; Philosophy of Science\; C ognitive Science\; and the Philosophy of Mind. (https://www.jenanni.com/) DURATION:P1D DTSTAMP:20240606T190136Z DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240606 LAST-MODIFIED:20240606T190136Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Jenann Ismael - Philosophy Colloquium UID:CAL-8a008ae5-8f05e4c1-018f-ee68c8b5-00005c6edemobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Ethics:/user/public-user/Top ics/Ethics X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Conference_Symposium:/user/p ublic-user/Lectures_Conferences/Conference_Symposium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Jenann Ismael X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Philosophy Colloquia X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:rmg66 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:967 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:1 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:2262 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:864.3333333333334 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:1295 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:863.3333333333334 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Smiling Lady X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/Jenann Ismael Sept 2024_20240606064356PM.j pg X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/Jenann Ismael Sept 2024_202406060643 56PM-thumb.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=00f1fcdb-0f068baf-010f-068baf83-00000004:None CREATED:20241118T181933Z DESCRIPTION:Jiji Zhang\, Speaker\n\nTitle: Regularity-theoretic interventi onism\n\nAbstract: As an influential approach to theorizing about causati on\, interventionism is standardly presented as following a counterfactua l line of attack. I examine the main reasons for treating interventionism as a broadly counterfactual account and argue that those reasons track f eatures that are not essential to the attractiveness of interventionism. I outline a way to formulate interventionism that is broadly regularity-t heoretic and highlight some potential advantages of this perspective. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20241118T181933Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20241122T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20241118T181933Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium UID:CAL-8a000483-92c3adf6-0193-408058b3-00005ecademobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Jiji Zhang\, Professor\, The Chinese University of Hong Kong X-BEDEWORK-STUDENT-CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-EMAIL=nancy.pfeiffer@duke.edu: Nancy Pfeiffer X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:ngp9 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philosop hy) END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Ethics CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=8a000483-92c3adf6-0193-4026b520-00005a2c:Pfeiffer\, Nancy CREATED:20250128T213120Z DESCRIPTION:Sara Aronowitz\, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Univ ersity of Toronto\, will join the Duke Philosophy Department for a colloq uium talk on "Learning What to Value\," from 3:00 - 5:00 p.m. on Friday\, January 31.\n\nABSTRACT: In theories of rational decision-making\, we of ten take an agent's preferences as given and criticize them only when the y fail to be internally coherent. This raises a question: is there a poss ible critique of preferences beyond coherence? In particular\, consider c ases where intuitively\, increased domain knowledge leads to new values\, such as when being forced to look at a lot of Minimalist paintings for a course leads to a new interest and appreciation for those paintings. Lik ewise\, across the lifespan\, we change what we care about in ways that s eem to reflect our experience. On their face\, these cases look like desc riptive knowledge about the world shaping preferences in a rational\, or at least comprehensible\, fashion. I will argue that we can indeed give a cogent account of this process using tools from reinforcement learning a nd the cognitive science of motivated behavior. The key is allowing descr iptive facts to shape the state space\, the division of the world and the agent's actions into coarse-grained possibilities.\n \nAreas of Speciali zation: Epistemology\, Philosophy of Cognitive Science\nAreas of Interest : Decision Theory\, Arabic and Islamic Philosophy\, Philosophy of Artific ial Intelligence. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20250130T211321Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250131T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20250130T211321Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:"Learning What to Value" - Philosophy Colloquium UID:CAL-8a000483-92c3adf6-0194-aed373af-00001ce9demobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Ethics:/user/public-user/Top ics/Ethics X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:rmg66 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Sara Aronowitz X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Duke Philosophy Colloquia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Ethics CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=8a000483-92c3adf6-0193-4026b520-00005a2c:Pfeiffer\, Nancy CREATED:20250203T221329Z DESCRIPTION:Come to Duke's Philosophy Department and enjoy a talk by Danie l Burnston\, Associate Professor and Director of Cognitive Studies at Tul ane University.\n\n"A Reductionist Approach to Decision-Making"\n \nAnti- reductionism about commonsense psychological concepts is something of a c onsensus view in philosophy of mind. If this is right\, then we can unde rstand the nature of concepts like 'belief'\, 'intention'\, and 'decision ' independently of insights from the neurosciences. I argue\, contra thi s view\, that neuroscience is rapidly progressing towards reducing the co mmonsense notion of 'decision'. I begin by articulating a view of episte mic reduction based on Ernst Nagel's notion of "connectability." I then introduce "accumulation to bound" models of decision-making from the neur osciences and argue that explanation with these models meets this charact erization. I then tackle two sets of intuitions about psychological kind s: that they are inherently normative and that they are inherently pheno menal. I argue that\, far from being a barrier to reduction\, accumulati on to bound models provide us with deep insight into the normative and ph enomenal properties of the kind 'decision'. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20250210T153247Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250214T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20250210T153247Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:A Reductionist Approach to Decision-Making UID:CAL-8a000483-92c3adf6-0194-cde03260-000027d0demobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Ethics:/user/public-user/Top ics/Ethics X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Daniel Burnston X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Duke Philosophy Colloquia X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:rmg66 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:45 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:936 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:669 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:936 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:624 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Daniel Burnston - Youngish white man with brown hair &\; beard &\; glasses X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/Daniel Burnston_20250210032207PM.png X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/Daniel Burnston_20250210032207PM-thu mb.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=8a000483-92c3adf6-0193-4026b520-00005a2c:Pfeiffer\, Nancy CREATED:20250203T221445Z DESCRIPTION:Come to Duke's Philosophy Department and enjoy a talk by Profe ssor Jorge Morales on "Seeing What's Not There."\n\nAbstract: A foundatio nal question in the philosophy of perception is: What can perception be a bout? A common-sense answer-accepted by the philosopher\, the cognitive s cientist\, and the person on the street-is that perception is about "what is there": objects (and their properties) that are present in the enviro nment around us. This is true\, but perception is also about what is not there. Absences can be perceived. If you visited the Louvre in 1912\, you could have seen that the Mona Lisa was not there. If you visit Egypt\, y ou can see that the Sphynx is missing its nose. If your laptop were stole n\, you could see it was no longer where you left it. One might think the se kinds of experiences involve inference rather than perception\, but I will argue that seeing an absence bears the right marks of perception. To show this\, I develop a general model of perception based on "object fil es"-a classic construct from cognitive science-and supplement it with a n ovel notion I call "perceptual frames". The main consequence of the model is that it makes seeing present and absent things continuous and reliant on the same kind of processes. Moreover\, it overcomes limitations of cu rrent proposals and avoids reducing the perception of absences to epistem ic states\, mental imagery\, or other unrelated visual phenomena. The pro posed approach allows absent objects\, as well as missing parts and prope rties\, to be proper perceptual contents of experience\, shedding light o n the mental architecture that supports both cognition and perception. Pe rception is about what is there-but just as crucially\, it is about what is missing.\n\nJorge Morales is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Philosophy at Northeastern University. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20250213T143135Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250221T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20250213T143135Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:"Seeing What's Not There" - Philosophy Colloquium UID:CAL-8a000483-92c3adf6-0194-cde15b84-000027d1demobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Jorge Morales X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Duke Philosophy Colloquia X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:rmg66 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:30 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:604 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:432.6666666666667 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:604 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:402.6666666666667 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Jorge Morales - man with black glasses\, blue su it X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/Jorge Morales 1_20250210032529PM.png X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/Jorge Morales 1_20250210032529PM-thu mb.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Ethics CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=8a000483-92c3adf6-0193-4026b520-00005a2c:Pfeiffer\, Nancy CREATED:20250203T221445Z DESCRIPTION:Abstract: On broadly Copernican grounds\, we are entitled to d efault assume that apparently behaviorally sophisticated extraterrestrial entities ("aliens") would be conscious. Otherwise\, we humans would be inexplicably\, implausibly lucky to have consciousness\, while similarly behaviorally sophisticated entities elsewhere would be mere shells\, devo id of consciousness. However\, this Copernican default assumption is can celed in the case of behaviorally sophisticated entities designed to mimi c superficial features associated with consciousness ("consciousness mimi cs")\, and in particular a broad class of current\, near-future\, and hyp othetical robots. These considerations jointly defeat an otherwise poten tially attractive parity principle\, according to which we should apply t he same types of behavioral or cognitive tests to aliens and robots\, att ributing or denying consciousness similarly to the extent they perform si milarly. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20250226T133238Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250321T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20250226T133238Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:The Copernican Argument for Alien Consciousness\; the Mimicry Argu ment Against Robot Consciousness UID:CAL-8a000483-92c3adf6-0194-cde641c6-000028fddemobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Ethics:/user/public-user/Top ics/Ethics X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Eric Schwitzgebel X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Duke Philosophy Colloquia X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:rmg66 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:6 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:53 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:791 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:576.3333333333334 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:785 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:523.3333333333334 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Eric Schwitzgebel - Man\, with glasses\, wearing maroon t-shirt and black and white collard shirt standing in front of gr eenery X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/eric-schwitzgebel-square_20250213023920PM. jpeg X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/eric-schwitzgebel-square_20250213023 920PM-thumb.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Ethics CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=00f1fcdb-0f068baf-010f-068baf83-00000004:None CREATED:20250218T184049Z DESCRIPTION:Robert Pasnau\, Duke's Visiting Mahoney Scholar will be giving a talk entitled: "How to Control Your Will and Succeed in Life" \n \nAbs tract. Controlling our wills\, by common consent\, is one of the keys to success in life. But how do we do it? Historically\, there are two kinds of answers. One kind of answer goes back to Augustine and\, before him\, to the Stoics: that the fragmentation of our various wills is a kind of d isease that makes happiness impossible. But neither the Stoics nor August ine could offer a persuasive account of how we cure ourselves of that dis ease. This led later medieval philosophers to a different kind of answer: that we have within us a power of will that has the freedom to control i tself. This idea of a free will is the origin of the freewill problem as we now understand it. But does it make sense? Can the will control itself ? Or do we have to fall back on the sort of story that Augustine told? In that case it is not clear that we have any control over our wills at all . Perhaps that is exactly why success is life is so elusive! DURATION:PT1H30M DTSTAMP:20250325T173408Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250327T170000 LAST-MODIFIED:20250325T173408Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:How to Control Your Will and Succeed in Life UID:CAL-8a000483-92c3adf6-0195-1a5ce300-0000015ademobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Ethics:/user/public-user/Top ics/Ethics X-BEDEWORK-STUDENT-CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-EMAIL=robert.pasnau@duke.edu:R obert Pasnau X-BEDEWORK-CS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DESCRIPTION="/principals/users/agrp__Artsan dSciences_MedievalandRenaissanceStudies,":Medieval and Renaissance Studie s X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Robert Pasnau X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Mahoney Lecture 2025 X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:ngp9 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philosop hy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:289 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:199 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:289 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:199 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Robert Pasnau END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=8a000483-92c3adf6-0193-4026b520-00005a2c:Pfeiffer\, Nancy CREATED:20250210T151132Z DESCRIPTION:Abstract: While philosophers sometimes identify betrayal as a reactive attitude specifically associated with broken trust\, there has been relatively little sustained analysis of this attitude in the relevan t literature. In this talk\, I defend a particular view of (what I will r efer to as) affective betrayal. I articulate the attitude's key marks\, d isentangle it from related emotions and emotional processes\, and examine its roles in extant accounts of blame and forgiveness. As I will argue\, affective betrayal has a distinctive type of normative significance and calls for a distinctive type of interpersonal repair. DURATION:PT2H DTSTAMP:20250327T150902Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250418T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20250327T150902Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:"The Attitude of Betrayal" UID:CAL-8a000483-92c3adf6-0194-f06a677a-00005331demobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Monique Wonderly X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Duke Philosophy Colloquia X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:rmg66 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philoso phy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:37 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:615 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:447 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:615 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:410 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Monique Wonderly - Woman with dark\, shoulder-le ngth hair\, dark shirt X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/Headshot Monique Wonderly_20250210033101PM .jpg X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/Headshot Monique Wonderly_2025021003 3101PM-thumb.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT CATEGORIES:Humanities CATEGORIES:Social Sciences CATEGORIES:Lectures/Conferences CATEGORIES:Utilities CATEGORIES:Health/Wellness CATEGORIES:Lecture/Talk CATEGORIES:Panel/Seminar/Colloquium CATEGORIES:Main CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-UID=00f1fcdb-0f068baf-010f-068baf83-00000004:None CREATED:20250929T173734Z DESCRIPTION:Daniel Hausman is the Herbert A. Simon and Hilldale Professor of Philosophy Emeritus\, University of Wisconsin-Madison.\n\nABSTRACT: He alth is in itself good for people\, and it contributes to other good thin gs. If one supposes\, as economists do\, that preference satisfaction is a guide to well-being\, one can determine the contribution of health to w ell-being by eliciting preferences. Yet it is problematic to measure heal th by its contribution to well-being and well-being by the satisfaction o f preferences. The contribution of health to well-being is not separable from the contributions of other goods\, and individuals who have serious health deficits may restructure their lives so as to attain a level of we ll-being fully comparable to the well-being of those who have no health p roblems. Moreover\, from a public perspective in a liberal state\, the co ntribution that health makes to opportunity may be a better measure of th e value of health than its contribution to well-being. Yet\, measuring he alth by its contribution to well-being apparently makes the burdens of il l-health commensurable with other goods\, and\, moreover\, it is question able whether there is a feasible alternative to measuring health by well- being and well-being by preferences. DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251107T170000 DTSTAMP:20251003T202527Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251107T150000 LAST-MODIFIED:20251003T202527Z LOCATION;X-BEDEWORK-UID=18832edc-1b287efb-011b-2c13b1c8-00000011:West Duke 202 STATUS:CONFIRMED SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium: "Health and Well-Being: Some Complications" UID:CAL-8a00ec8b-979413b9-0199-968d1d83-000066e5demobedework@mysite.edu X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Main:/user/public-user/Utili ties/Main X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Lecture_Talk:/user/public-us er/Lectures_Conferences/Lecture_Talk X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Panel_Seminar_Colloquium:/us er/public-user/Lectures_Conferences/Panel_Seminar_Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Health_Wellness:/user/public -user/Topics/Health_Wellness X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Humanities:/user/public-user /Topics/Humanities X-BEDEWORK-ALIAS;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-DISPLAYNAME=Social Sciences:/user/public -user/Topics/Social Sciences X-BEDEWORK-STUDENT-CONTACT;X-BEDEWORK-PARAM-EMAIL=nancy.pfeiffer@duke.edu: Nancy Pfeiffer X-BEDEWORK-SPEAKER:Daniel M. Hausman X-BEDEWORK-DUKE-SERIES:Colloquium X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X1:0 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y1:41 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-X2:1179 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-Y2:827 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-WIDTH:1179 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-CROP-HEIGHT:786 X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE-ALT-TEXT:Dan Hausman X-BEDEWORK-SUBMITTEDBY:ngp9 for Philosophy (agrp__ArtsandSciences_Philosop hy) X-BEDEWORK-IMAGE:/public/Images/Small headshot_20251003082247PM.jpeg X-BEDEWORK-THUMB-IMAGE:/public/Images/Small headshot_20251003082247PM-thum b.png END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR