Rachana Kamtekar, University of Arizona

Who believes 'no-one does wrong willingly', and why?
I argue that the (supposedly) 'Socratic intellectualist' thesis 'no-one does wrong willingly' is based not on psychological eudaimonism, the thesis that we always do or pursue what seems best, but on the more fundamental thesis that human nature seeks, and so we engage in purposive action in order to secure, our real good. Attention to the dialectical contexts in which 'no-one does wrong willingly' appears in the dialogues makes it possible to see that Plato's arguments for this thesis in fact adopt and develop two sophistic ideas: (a) that there is such a thing as real/natural advantage, which it is in our nature to desire and pursue, and (b) that which is contrary to our natural desires and pursuits is unwilling (akôn). Plato uses (a) and (b) to explain his contemporaries' and predecessors' judgments that bad actions done under duress are compelled.